[ipv6hackers] thc-ipv6 v3.0, IPv6 complexity and evasions
erey at ernw.de
Sat Oct 17 08:51:25 CEST 2015
> yes I know from own harsh experiences :)
> but the drop rate is about 50% on average.
> however: on my main server the drop is 100% because my uplink is
> dropping. thankfully I have alternatives.
> and it is something that has to be fixed. dropping fragmented packets is
> a no-no, independent of the IP version.
except for the IP version that kinda deprecates fragmentation, that is IPv6.
you know that I'm a big fan of "drop [all] the crap at your network border"... one of Germany's largest enterprise networks drop all fragments at their borders since 12 months [IPv6]. they don't observe any issues, not even hits on the respective ACLs...
have a great weekend everybody
> > * Slide #9:
> > Some router implementations, when they receive a packet meant for a node
> > that has no entry in the Neighbor Cache, they drop the packet, and
> > engage in Neighbor Discovery. If you really engage into sending one
> > probe from a different address at a time, chances are that you might get
> > no response as a result of this.
> this depends on the router/switch, I also have seen this behaviour.
> I have also seen a different behaviour, a router dropping packets if
> they haven't have the local sender in their neighbor list.
> the way to go might be an unsolitated NA broadcast.
> In the situation where I experimented however, I was not in such a LAN
> where either drop type happens.
> My guess would be that this drop is based on NDP exhaustion attack
> prevention implementations.
> > * Slide #13
> > What do you mean by "splitting connections"?
> you send from 2001::1 to the server, the server sends the reply packets
> to 2001:2. Pretty simple, but fucks up the flow analysis.
> The tool does just this basic implementation for TCP as a POC. you could
> do that for all protocols, to/from random addresses from the client (and
> server), fragment packets, etc.
> > * Slide #31
> > What does Windows do when multiple FHs are present?
> process them without any issues. 100 atomic fragments? yep, will eat it.
> multilevel fragmentation, yep, can do them too.
> > You say "Resending fragments with different data:
> > last received is used". But you previously said that Windows doesn't
> > allow overlaping fragments, so... what would "Resending fragments with
> > different data" actually mean?
> exactly that. it is the exact same fragment part that is sent first with
> fake data then with real data, and the last packet (so here the real
> data) is processed.
> it seems that windows interprets them as a resend and surprisingly takes
> the newer data, as - how I implemented this test case - they do not overlap.
> > * Slide #39
> > You say that draft-ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain-09 (now RFC7112!) is
> > incomplete. What, specifically, are you thinking of? (prohibition of
> > overlapping fragments is in a different RFC).
> the draft (or now RFC) is great.
> incomplete in so far, as in my opinion there has to be a MUST on the
> order of EHs, and how often each EH is allowed to be present (all just
> one except for DST EH two).
> that would make it easier for firewalls, IDS etc. systems to analyse
> packets. Due to the high complexity of possibilities, thats why it is so
> difficult to get right.
> > * Slide #41
> > You just flood the local netork with lots of PIOS, just lost of RAs, or
> > what?
> yeah that is basically the attack I discovered in 2007 still works today
> (not reliably for the crashes though). floods with random RAs with many
> SLAACs and route entries, but (the -s option) with small lifetimes.
> Marc Heuse
> PGP: AF3D 1D4C D810 F0BB 977D 3807 C7EE D0A0 6BE9 F573
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