[ipv6hackers] opportunistic encryption in IPv6

Owen DeLong owend at he.net
Tue Jun 11 02:02:56 CEST 2013

> The fundamental challenge for encryption is key distribution and management:
> * How do I authenticate the intended recipient(s)?

This is a traditional challenge with many traditional solutions, all of which have tradeoffs, especially in M2M communications.

> * How do I distribute a key without letting anyone except the intended recipient(s) get it?

DH pretty well solves this, no?

> * How do I manage the key to periodically change it while keeping it confidential?

Again, DH with PFS makes this a solved problem AFAIK.

> * How do I notify the recipient if the key was compromised or is otherwise invalid?

This doesn't seem all that hard so long as a rekey instruction is built into the protocol. I believe that's already the case with IPSEC SAs, no?

Vs. this paper, I think that opportunistic IPSEC, ala Micr0$0ft's "direct-connect" or whatever they call it product is quite a bit more viable.

It depends on AD as a PKI distribution mechanism for authentication.


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